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This paper surveys the water sector of Israel. It describes sources and uses and 
reviews economic and political issues. The focus is solely on Israel; regional water 
questions  the subject of other papers in the conference are not discussed.  
The public debate on water in Israel is overshadowed nowadays by the acute 
crisis we are experiencing; the country is facing shortages and cuts in supply. One 
may easily conclude that the sector is in shambles. My review of the issues has led to 
a more balanced conclusion: there was neglect, a lot should be repaired, and attention 
must be paid to changing circumstances; but the fundamental structure of the sector is 
sound, a basis for reforms exists, and the water economy can be expected to fulfill its 
functions, now and in the future. 
 
General Features 
Israel is a small and narrow country; half of its area is dry desert. Precipitation, only 
in the winter, averages more than 700 mm per year in the north and less than 35 mm 
in the southern tip of the country. The core functions of the water sector have been to 
store water from winter to summer and from rainy to dry years and to carry water 
from the north to the center and the south. With expanding population and growing 
urbanization, sewage treatment and recycled water are taking the center of the stage. 
Fresh water is stored in the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias, Figure 1) and in 
several groundwater reservoirs; the largest two are the Mountain Aquifer and the 
Coastal Aquifer. The Mountain Aquifer is located mostly under the West Bank from a 
point south of Nazareth to Beer Sheva (political borders are marked in Figure 1 by 
broken dotted lines). The Coastal Aquifer is stretched along the Mediterranean from a  
                                                            
* Prepared for the conference on: "Water in the Jordan Valley: Technical Solutions & 
Regional Cooperation," University of Oklahoma, International Programs Center, 
Center for Peace Studies, Norman, Oklahoma, November 13-14, 2001. 
** Eli Feinerman and Yakir Plessner read an earlier draft and offered helpful 
comments. Discussions with Gadi Rosenthal added insight and information. Devoira 
Auerbach provided editorial assistance. The responsibility for the product is mine.   3
Figure 1: A Map of Israel and the National Project 
Source: Kliot, Nurit, Water Resources and Conflicts in the Middle East, Routledge, 1994 
 
point south of Haifa to Gaza. The National Water Project (Carrier) is a system of 
conduits running west and south from the Sea of Galilee and connecting most of the 
sources and users of water in the country. Two thirds of the water in Israel is supplied 
by the largest utility, Mekorot Co., and the company also operates the National 
Project. The other suppliers are private well owners, municipalities, and regional 
cooperatives. Municipalities are required to collect and treat their sewage and several   4
cities have cooperative projects with agricultural interests in their vicinity. The 
metropolitan area of Tel Aviv, the most populated, is supplying recycled water to the 
western Negev. 
As natural resources, the water reservoirs are common pools. Under open 
access individuals will behave as free riders: they will pump water so long as it is 
beneficial for their own use disregarding the detrimental effect that their pumping has 
on other users of the reservoirs (for example, by lowering water levels or drawing in 
salty ocean water). The resource will be depleted. In addition, suppliers are 
monopolies, particularly Mekorot. These features call for government intervention. 
By law, all water sources in the country are publicly owned; there is no private 
ownership of water. The Water Commissioner is responsible for the utilization and 
the sustainability of the resources. The law requires measurement of all uses of water. 
This means that wells and pumps are monitored and consumers￿households, 
manufacturers, farmers, and others￿pay by the quantity they use. 
The ￿safe yield￿ water supply from natural sources is estimated to be 1,550 
million CM per year (Water Commission, 2000).
1 To this are added 270 million CM 
of recycled water. The forecast is that by the year 2020, Israel will utilize 830 MCM 
of recycled water per year. The first comparatively large, 50 MCM per year, 
desalination plant is soon to be constructed on the coast of the Mediterranean south of 
Tel Aviv. Consumption is some 720 MCM in households and industry and the rest in 
agriculture. The government aims now to supply agriculture with 1,130 MCM per 
year from all sources but this may not be possible in the coming years. 
Resources are limited and their development is expensive; population growth 
has surpassed over the last half-century water supply, and the amount available 
per person has declined. However, as Figure 2 demonstrates, per-capita consumption 
in households and industry has remained essentially constant, while per-person water 
available for agriculture is today less than half the volume of the 1960s. Despite the  
                                                            
1 The units of measurement are: CM = cubic meter, MCM = million cubic meters. 
One CM = 264 American gallons, 1 acre-foot = 1220 CM.  
The available supply of 1,550 MCM a year is of water to use in Israel and the 
Jewish settlements on the Golan and in the West Bank and Gaza. Earlier, higher 
estimates (a number often cited was 1,830 MCM) included water lost in floods, used 
in the West Bank, and supplied now to Jordan. 
   5
 
Figure 2: Per Capita Water Utilization (CM per Year) 
(Water use divided by population in the country) 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
reduction, agricultural production per-capita is today more than 150% of the quantity 
produced 40 years ago. By these numbers, productivity of water has increase three-
fold. 
Water potential and safe yields are generally quoted in terms of average use. 
Precipitation varies from year to year as can be seen from the 150-year record for 
Nablus in Figure 3 (by evidence from other locations, the extremely low value for 
1900 is an error). But not only does annual rain change, long-term averages are also 
not constant. The heavy line in the diagram depicts 25-year means; the average for the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century was more than 20% higher than the lowest value 
that the heavy line hit￿in 1979. With varying rain, replenishment of the reservoirs is 
also not stable (moreover, the changes in the moving average indicate that water 
potential may also change gradually).  
There is a tradeoff between average supply and its reliability. With a policy of 
regular extraction of large quantities of water, reservoirs are often low and, since 
replenishment varies, reliable supply cannot be maintained. This truism was brought 
home twice in the last 15 years, once in 1990-91 and again more recently. Israel is 
now facing an acute water crisis into which we slid when several dry years followed a 
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Figure 3: Rain in Nablus, mm per Year and 25 Year Moving Average 
Source: Lumas, Jacob and Nuna Rinberg, ￿Reconstruction of Rain in Nablus 1870-1990,￿ Water and 
Irrigation, 1992 (Hebrew) and recent information from the Meteorological Service. 
 
indeed, the water level in the Sea of Galilee is lower now than it has ever been in 
known history and the aquifers show clear signs of overdrafting but the overall picture 
is not as bad as the public may be led to believe. 
 
Comprehensive Water Balance 
Drawing on Tony Allan (2000), who coined the term ￿virtual￿ for water imbedded in 
traded food, Table 1 presents a rough calculation of the comprehensive water balance 
of Israel. Average water needs for food production, including rain, is 1000 CM per 
person per year (this is a global average, not specific to Israel). Hence, for a 
population of 6.5 million, water needed for food production is 6,500 MCM a year. 
Adding households and industry, total needs are 7,300 MCM per year. Rain falling on 
400,000 hectares of cultivated land contributes 1,600 MCM to the balance, 2,000 
MCM come from natural and other sources, and 500 MCM of virtual water are 
withdrawn in exports. The available supply is 3,100 MCM. The gap between the 
needs and available water is 4,200 MCM per year. 
The gap is closed by imported food, grain in particular. Israel imports 3.8 
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Table 1: Water Balance (in MCM per year) 
 
Needs   
Food (1000 CM per person per year)  6,500 
Households (100)  650 
Industry 150 
Total Needs  7,300 
  
Availability   
In the soil (400,000 h x 400 mm)  1,600 
Production (including recycled)  2,000 
Less: Export  -500 
Total Available  3,100 
  
Gap (needs minus availability)  4,200 
  
Import   
Grain (food, feed and oil, 3.8 million t/yr)  3,800 
Other 400 
Total Import  4,200 
 
produce 1 kg of grain; the imported grain is therefore equivalent to 3,800 MCM per 
year. For the remainder I added other imports sugar, beef, cereals, dried fruits, 
etc. although I do not know the water content of these products.  
The balance of Table 1 is just a first approximation and my guesstimate of 
local availability was built on optimistic assumptions, but the general picture is clear: 
water from local sources covers less than 50% of the needs of the country. Moreover, 
local sources cover only 35% of the water used in food production for the domestic 
markets. Local water is not crucial for food supply to the population of Israel. This 
does not mean that we can do without water; it means that a reduction, even a sharp 
reduction, of allocation to agriculture will not risk the food situation of the country. 
The crisis is painful but it need not cause panic. 
Table 1 reveals the dependency of Israel on food trade (the country also 
depends on trade in other items not shown here). It was pointed out by Allan that this 
dependency is a common attribute of all the countries in the Middle East, without 
imports we could not have fed our populations. Starving people would have then 
fought ceaselessly over every drop of water. Here is globalization contributing to 
peace. 
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Hydropolitics 
Government intervention in the management of water is a necessary consequence of 
the common pool features of the resources and the monopoly position of the suppliers. 
Once the government is involved, in any issue, interest groups rise in an attempt to 
change public policies in their favor (Zusman, 1997). Lobbies are particularly 
prevalent in democracies but political pressure can be found everywhere. The two 
strongest groups in the water sector, the farmers and the workers of Mekorot, have 
different interests and attempt to affect different aspects of policy. (The ￿greens￿ form 
the third group. They are growing in strength but their effect is still marginal.) 
The main interest of the farmers is to get large supplies of water at the lowest 
possible price. Water is an important input in agriculture and many farmers 
enthusiastically support their representatives in the political arena. The agricultural 
lobby is therefore well organized and acts vigorously in advancing its case. It is said 
in Israel (and it can be shown mathematically) that a politician stands firm when 
pushed on all sides. But, as water is not an economically important item in the budget 
of households or in the cost of manufacturing, the farmers do not face strong 
opposition and they have succeeded in tilting the policy in their favor. It must be 
added however that the farm lobby, although still alive and supported in high places, 
has lost some of its power in the last decade or two. The loss can be attributed to the 
decline of the share of agricultural output and employment in the national economy 
and perhaps also to the growing intuitive comprehension, by the public, of the 
realities presented in Table 1. 
Comparatively low prices and large quantities of water allocated to agriculture 
result in two major consequences: a. the reservoirs are depleted and supply is put at 
risk, and b. economic ￿waste￿ is created in the sense that water is used in products 
that cannot cover the real cost of the factor. This is particularly true for ￿virtual￿ water 
in some of the exports; citrus is an example. 
Interest groups, farmers among them, do not adopt the point of view of the 
economy at large they act as free riders. The farm lobby advocates expensive 
expansion of supply to overcome shortage and it is fast to find patriotic justifications 
for subsidies to agriculture. The ability of a lobby to affect policy, the power of the 
interest group, depends on the environment in which it operates. Consider a region 
drawing water from a river and exhausting the flow, both in regular and in dry years.   9
There is no more water than what the river carries and, as much as it may try, a 
political lobby cannot pressure the authorities to increase allocation. The situation is 
different when supply is, as in Israel, from reservoirs. The total amount of water 
stored in the coastal aquifer, to take one example, is estimated to be 15-18 billion MC; 
safe yield is 250-300 MCM per year, less than 2% of the storage. Overdrafting 
accelerates the accumulation of salts in the aquifer, but there is no physical constraint 
to tie the hand of the Water Commissioner when he is, willingly or reluctantly, 
yielding to pressure for more water.
2  
Originally, the Commissioner operated from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
was deemed to be under the influence of agricultural interests. The Water 
Commission was moved, several years ago, to the Ministry of Infrastructure. The 
change was not motivated by efficiency considerations but it was welcome by many 
observers of the water sector. Their happiness was premature. The Minister of 
Infrastructure at the time was a farmer; he even owned the largest private farm in the 
country, and he appointed another farmer as the Water Commissioner. In my 
judgment, it was the pro-farm policy of this Commissioner￿a myopic pro-farm 
policy that paved the way for the current crisis.  
The workers of Mekorot form the other interest group in the water sector. 
Their power stems from their organization￿2,200 men and women under a strong 
union leadership￿but especially from their control of the supply: their hand is on the 
tap. The first interest of the workers is income; their salaries are among the highest in 
the country. Inflated salaries increase the cost of water, but perhaps more costly is the 
support the workers give to the monopolistic power of the company. As a large 
monopoly, Mekorot may build expensive projects and secure employment for its 
workforce, safely assuming that all costs will eventually be covered. The government 
has been trying, for more than 10 years, to reform the company, to separate its 
operations into several relatively small units, and make it into a public utility, 
independent and responsible for its finance. The workers opposed the reform and, 
although it did have some important effects on the economic functioning of the 
company, it was only partly successful. An indicator of the remaining strength of  
                                                            
2 Overdrafting is not unique to Israel. ￿Virtually everywhere, governments and 
farmers have their heads in the sand on the groundwater problem￿but it is not going 
away. Irrigation cutbacks will occur.￿ (Postel, 1999, p. 251.) 
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Mekorot is that the present Water Commissioner was the chief engineer of the 
company before assuming his position as a public servant. (Meanwhile, the former 
Minister of Infrastructure has become the Prime Minister and he is now using his top 
position to block austerity moves suggested by the new Commissioner.) 
 
Allocation 
There are two major allocation problems in the water sector: a. allocation of 
extraction; where, when, and how much to pump; b. allocation of water for utilization 
and consumption. The two problems are distinct, although the law obscures the 
distinction.  
The criterion for extraction of water is sustainability of the resource. The role 
of the Water Commissioner is to guard the long run stability of the quantity and 
quality of water. Fulfilling this role may require decisions on each source and well 
separately, depending on local hydro-geological circumstances. Accordingly, the law 
specifies that water may be extracted only under a license from the Commissioner. 
The criterion for the allocation of water for consumption and utilization is 
efficiency; that is, the maximization of economic welfare from the use of water. Two 
management instruments are in use: prices and quotas. Households and most 
manufacturers can purchase from Mekorot all their demand at the established prices. 
Water in agriculture is allocated by quota and, in addition, farmers who purchase 
water
3 pay Mekorot or the regional suppliers. In principle quotas are reallocated every 
year, in practice they have not changed much in the last several decades (marginal 
changes were made and will be discussed below). 
Prices reflect cost. Two major factors have affected cost of water in Israel; one 
has been the shift from relatively inexpensive to higher cost systems and the other￿
the rise in the world price of energy since 1974. I start with a sketch of historical 
development of cost and demand in Figure 4. The diagram is drawn in today￿s prices; 
that is, it does not reflect past changes in the price of energy. The graph marked 
￿supply￿ traces the cost of water: cost of local supply is 12 US cents a CM, average 
cost of the national project is 35 cents a CM, and cost of desalination is estimated to  
                                                            
3 Some farmers own private wells and others, around and above the Sea of Galilee, 
pump directly from the lake or the Jordan River (all under license).   11
 
Figure 4: Three Epochs in the Water Economy 
 
be 60 cents per CM.
4 The graph also traces historical changes of costs in the three 
epochs of the development of the water economy of Israel. In the 1950s and early 
1960s Israel was in the epoch of local supply; the National Project opened in 1964 a 
new epoch of expansion, at a higher cost, from 600 MCM to 1,550 MCM a year. The 
future will be the epoch of desalination. 
  The lines marked 1960, 1970, 2001, and 2015 represent demand in these 
years. In 1960, a few years after the establishment of the state, irrigation was not 
widely practiced and the demand for water was modest. But it has expanded. In the 
early years the expansion was generally due to the introduction of irrigation into areas 
of dry farming, and more recently, when the expansion of agriculture is slower, most 
of the increased demand is due to growth of population. As plotted, the current 
demand, of 2001, puts Israel in the transition period, between the epoch of the 
National Project and that of desalination. We shall return below to some of the 
implications of the conceptual framework of Figure 4. 
The government sets the price that the controlled monopoly Mekorot may 
charge; essentially it is the same price for all users in agriculture. Regional  
                                                            
4 The price implicit in the contract signed recently with the company chosen to build 
the first desalination plant was surprisingly low, 53 cent per CM. Connecting to the 
























Figure 5: Price Indexes in Agriculture, Water and Irrigated Products, 
Deflated by the Consumer Price Index, 1952=100 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
suppliers￿most of them cooperatives charge to cover cost. The Water Commission 
operated in the past an Equalization Fund: well owners and other low cost suppliers 
(who had access to local sources of water) contributed to the fund, high cost operators 
were compensated. Since Mekorot was the major provider of water to remote and 
hilly areas, the company received the lion￿s share of the accumulated funds.  
The index of real prices of water is depicted in Figure 5. The index aggregates 
prices paid to Mekorot and to other suppliers. The price of water has increased, since 
1952, two and a half times. But, as the graph clearly indicates, water prices did not 
increase markedly in the 1960s when water from the more expensive national project 
started moving to the south. Price increases were made politically feasible by the 
dramatic rise in energy costs, in the early 1970s. This observation helps to explain the 
different experiences of Israel and the western US.  
It was recently reported that farmers in the Central Utah water project paid 0.7 
cents a CM while the value of the marginal productivity of water was 2.5 cents per 
CM, and the cost of providing the water was 25 cents per CM. Farmers in California 
paid 1.2 cents per CM. The American prices are much lower and the gap between cost 
and user pay is much wider than the corresponding values common in Israel. The 
explanation may lie in the nature of the supply. Most of the water supplied by the 




























Crops Water  13
component of cost is capital; this is sunk cost and, with the conventional accounting 
practices, it does not figure in the current public budgets. In contrast, Mekorot 
elevates water from the Sea of Galilee, 210 meters below sea level, close to 400 
meters to the hills and pushes it southwards. Israel￿s is therefore an energy intensive 
water project and the agricultural political lobby could not hold a Treasury burdened 
by increasing energy bills from making Mekorot￿s consumers share in the cost. 
Private and regional suppliers were affected by the increasing energy prices directly, 
in their electricity bills. 
 
Figure 6: Water in Agriculture, Quota and Use (MCM per Year) 
Source: Peretz, Assaf, Water Market Regulation: Quota, prices and Political Lobbying, 
Master Thesis, Faculty of Agriculture (Hebrew) 1999, and the Water Commission. 
 
The second graph in Figure 5 depicts the index of the prices farmers received 
for products of irrigated agriculture (crops, horticultural products, and flowers). Since 
the mid-1950s, except for the decade of the 1970s, the index has shown a downward 
trend, reflecting developments in world markets where abundant supply has reduced 
food prices. Farmers in Israel were caught in the scissors action of rising water prices 
and decreasing product prices. The consequences are clearly seen in Figure 6: up to 
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has used less water than the quota allowed. True, some farmers may have been limited 
by the quota, but for the sector as a whole, in the last two decades, water was 
allocated by prices￿of water and products￿and not by the administrative quota. 
As indicated earlier, most of the quotas have been stable (since the early 
1970s). The dips in the mid 1980s and in 1990 are reflections of temporary cuts in 
allocation to agriculture when shortage occurred; particularly severe was the second 
crisis (the present crisis is still not reflected in the figure). For many farmers, quotas 
did not change, but not for all. There has been a persistent increase in aggregate quota 
throughout the period covered in the diagram. The crisis of 1990, like the current one, 
was created by a period of drought following years of overdrafting and tight supply. 
Still, allocation to agriculture kept expanding and the expansion policy was myopic: 
the cost of the crisis may turn out to be higher then the cost of gradual and controlled 
reduction in supply.  
The increased allocation to agriculture encouraged use of water in the sector 
(we shall see the mechanism shortly) despite gradual growth in fixed demand for 
urban water. The resulting overdrafting need not be large (estimates vary), even the 
smallest annual gaps accumulate, as every household with a bank account knows in 
theory or from experience. A jackpot may however save, at least for a while, a 
financially careless family. Israel hit a jackpot in the winter of 1991/92 when rains 
surpassed all records (Figure 3), reservoirs were filled to capacity and the books were 
reopened on blank pages. The policy of overdrafting of the last several years is 
evidence of a refusal to recognize that the roulette seldom returns a second time to 
favor lavishly the same player.  
 
Prices and Subsidies 
Water prices represented by the index of Figure 5 were average payments per CM. 
Mekorot customers in agriculture pay block rate prices that rise with the amount 
purchased: 20 cents per CM for any quantity up to 50% of the quota (the first block), 
25 cents for the next 30% and 32 cents for additional amounts. The purpose of this 
price structure is to combine support to agriculture with economic efficiency: support 
comes through lower prices for part of the amount used and efficiency is allegedly 
assured due to the fact that the ￿last,￿ marginal, unit is paid at full price. Although the 
introduction of block rate pricing in 1989 had some economic benefits, the claim that   15
it is an efficient pricing system is flawed in more than one way (Bar-Shira and 
Finkelshtain, 2000). We shall not go here into technical details, but will consider one 
effect of the method: By increasing the quota of a farm, as was occasionally done 
(Figure 6), the Water Commissioner extended the range of lower blocks, in this way 
he reduced the average price that the farmer paid, and increased the support the farm 
received. Block rate pricing thus gave the Commissioner powers that the legislators of 
the original Water Law did not have in mind. Moreover, in expanding the quota, the 
Commissioner encouraged use of water by the fortunate farmers who got the new 
allocations, even if the aggregate quantity was determined by prices. 
Economic support must be covered somehow and, indeed, the government 
covers every year 15-20% of the budget of Mekorot. But this is not the whole picture; 
municipalities pay Mekorot ￿at the city gate￿ 35 cents per CM, while the average 
price the farmers pay is only 25 cents a CM. In this way, urban consumer cross-
subsidize water in agriculture. There is however another way to look at the price 
structure and the cross-subsidization it implies. As indicated earlier, all farmers pay 
the same price and similarly municipalities pay one price. But costs vary, farmers in 
the far south and in the hills pay less than the cost of supply to their areas and farmers 
in the north and center pay more than the cost. Similarly, Tel Aviv, located on the 
coast, pays more and Jerusalem, at a higher elevation, pays less than its specific cost 
of water provision. Economic considerations would call for adjustment of prices to 
cost, but I cannot see the politician who will survive even a mild support of a rise in 
water rates in Jerusalem, the holy capital, relative to Tel Aviv, the city of business and 
entertainment. 
Economic considerations not withstanding, governments often subsidize 
business and other activities. Water is a convenient medium of support; it carries the 
subsidy to the end of the line, where costs are relatively high and farming conditions 
are harsh. Support of sectors in need is a government prerogative but good public 
housekeeping demands that costs be calculated properly and subsidies indicated 
explicitly in the budgets. General ￿principles￿ of one price that implicitly support 
some users more than others, obscure policies and reduce their effectiveness. 
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Extraction Levies 
Another, new form of price is the extraction levy that has been recently imposed. 
Consider Figure 4, as the demand for the year 2001 is depicted, consumers￿farmers 
and others￿are willing to pay for water more than the pecuniary cost of 35 cents per 
CM. In the diagram, if the price for 2001 is set at 35 cents, the quantity the consumers 
of all sectors will try to use exceeds the available amount of 1,550 MCM. The price 
equating supply and demand in the diagram is 45 cent, and to reach it, a ￿scarcity 
surcharge￿ of 10 cent should be added to the money cost of water in the National 
Project. The surcharge on local water will be even higher. This is the idea behind the 
extraction levy; the tax is calculated to reflect the ￿scarcity price￿ of water. It is 
imposed on well operators, including Mekorot, and it varies by region according to 
specific regional scarcity values. The current rates are between 10 and 13 cents per 
CM. 
This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of the 
extraction levy, but it should be indicated that the levy is an important economic 
instrument. When the levy is in effect, water users are confronted by the scarcity 
value. The levy makes users take the social effect of individual pumping into their 
own private considerations and, with it, they behave less as free riders and more as 
considerate users of a scarce resource. Although pump taxes are used in some places, 
I do not know of any country outside Israel that introduced scarcity prices for water. 
Needless to say, farmers opposed the extraction levy vehemently. It passed, 
despite their opposition, with the help of political horse trading: initially it was just a 
change of title, payments to the Equalization Fund were renamed ￿extraction levies,￿ 
and the farm lobby was ￿bribed￿ by a promise that all money accumulated in the 
defunct Fund will go to support recycling projects. Once the levy was established, it 
could be raised and expanded to regions that were originally not covered by it. Also, 
evidently, the passage of the levy is an indication of the waning political power of 
agricultural interests. 
The shift from equalization contributions to extraction levies was not just a 
change of title. In principle, there is an important difference between the two. 
Equalization charges were assessed on every supplier and well owner individually 
according to their specific operating costs. The charges encouraged ￿tax planning￿ 
and investments that were not economically justified. Extraction levies should not be   17
affected by the cost of the individual supplier.
5 Payments to the Equalization Fund 
distorted economic incentives, the extraction levies improve them.  
 
Sewage and Recycled Water 
By recent estimates, 55% of the water used in households and industry is returned as 
sewage. Eighty percent of the sewage is now collected and treated. Reclaimed water 
adds 30% to fresh water used in agriculture. This ratio is expected to increase both as 
the allocation of potable water to farm use is decreased and as sewage collection and 
diversion of recycled water to agriculture intensify. 
As indicated, the average cost of water to urban areas is 35 cents a CM. The 
cost of distributing the water to households and businesses, collecting the sewage, 
treating it, and getting the recycled water to the farms￿can add between one and two 
dollars per CM. Traditionally, we have regarded the water economy as consisting the 
extraction and conveyance systems and viewed urban water system as its small 
appendix. But by now, the urban water economy from the city gate to the consumers, 
to the treatment plant, and to final disposition￿is not smaller than the economy of 
fresh water, and it is growing.  
The government supports the sewage sector at two levels. At the first, the 
government finances investment in sewage and recycling projects in municipalities. 
This line of support from the state to the local authorities grew markedly in the 1990s 
when the impossibility to enforce the law requiring municipalities to collect and treat 
their sewage was recognized. City fathers found it so much easier to let the waste flow 
into the nearest riverbed than to built expensive treatment systems. 
At the second level the government supports investment in the adaptation of 
irrigation to reclaimed water. The cost of adaptation is not negligible: storage is 
prepared to keep treated water from winter to summer and new networks are 
constructed to assure that recycled sewage is not mixed with drinking water. I do not 
know of assessments of the value of the subsidies entailed by government support to 
sewage and recycling activities but, essentially, most of the initial capital outlays are 
covered by public funds. Farmers and their regional coops cannot mobilize on their 
own the amounts needed for these projects on the capital market. 
                                                            
5 The difference is not complete; the levy may be lowered for high cost private (non-
Mekorot) suppliers. It is not known yet how important this provision will be.    18
Judged by its size, the Tel Aviv treatment plant with the pipeline moving its 
product￿high quality reclaimed water￿to the Negev, is regarded as a national 
project and operated by Mekorot. For the other places, the accepted doctrine has been 
to encourage local solutions. In most cases, regional cooperatives take the recycled 
water from nearby cities. However, local solutions to the sewage problem raise 
difficult economic questions; for example, should farmers pay the cities for the treated 
water? Or, how can the cities be assured that the farmers will not reduce usage one 
day and leave the municipalities with treated water they have no way to dispose of? 
The recognition of these problems was one of the motivations for a fresh examination 
of the national sewage problem in a new master plan (a second motivation will be 
presented below). The examination will include a comparison of the doctrine of local 
solutions against the alternative of a central conduit that will carry treated sewage 
from the coastal region to the Negev. 
 
Quality Issues 
Several sources add salts to the water reservoirs in Israel; we shall consider two 
examples. In the north, salty springs flow into the Sea of Galilee; in the coastal area, 
winds deposit on the ground drops of water carried from the Mediterranean and the 
rains drain the salt into the aquifer. In the past, under natural conditions, when water 
was not extracted from the reservoirs, equilibrium prevailed; on average, a certain 
amount of salt was added yearly and the same amount was withdrawn. The process 
was almost visible in Sea of Galilee: nearby springs added salt to the lake and the 
Jordan River drained it toward the Dead Sea. A similar process operated under the 
ground in the aquifers. Under natural conditions, on average, the same amount of 
water added yearly by rain to the aquifer (the replenishment) flowed into the 
Mediterranean. The flow carried with it, again on average, the same amount of salt as 
was added annually.  
Identical, on average, input and output kept the salt content of the reservoirs 
constant. Thus 100 years ago the salt content of the Coastal Aquifer was some 60 mg 
of CL per litter (chlorine is an easily measured and common proxy for salt content) 
and the water was regarded of high quality. The natural salt content of the Sea of 
Galilee was close to 400 mg CL per litter. As part of the construction of the National 
Water Project, several of the salty springs were diverted to the Jordan River south of   19
the lake (in the Chlorine Water Carrier, Figure 1)
6 and as a result, the salt 
concentration was reduced to 260 mg CL per litter, a level considered tolerable for 
most crops. Today, when water from the Sea of Galilee is pumped to the National 
Project, salt from springs that were not captured and diverted is also carried in the 
pipelines. In this way, the concentration of salt in the lake is kept from increasing. 
   The situation in the Coastal Aquifer is different. In the epoch of local supply 
(Figure 4) wells pumped water from the aquifer for irrigation above it. The flow into 
the ocean was reduced and most of the irrigation water evaporated. Part of the water 
filtered to the subsoil, carrying salts, and gradually increasing their concentration in 
the reservoirs. Four sources have further intensified the concentration of salts and 
other pollutants in the coastal aquifer in the several last decades. One was irrigation 
over the aquifer with water from the Sea of Galilee; the second was heavy use of 
fertilizers in agriculture; some chemicals, particularly nitrogen leaked to the 
groundwater; the third source was salty water seeping into the aquifer when extraction 
reduced water-level and hence the pressure that had kept salty water at bay; and the 
fourth source was urbanization with breakaway sewage and other forms of pollution. 
The average salt content of the Coastal Aquifer has reached 200 mg CL per litter and 
is rising. More than a few wells are not operated anymore because of particularly high 
local concentration of pollutants. The situation is even worse in Gaza and in the 
smaller aquifers north of the Coastal Plain. 
Pollution and water quality is the second motivation for the fresh examination 
of the sewage problem mentioned in the previous section. Treated effluents are 
significantly saltier than the background water (water used in the households and 
businesses from which the sewage was collected) and, even after treatment, the water 
may be polluted with other undesired ingredients, chemical and biological. The use of 
reclaimed water, depending on the degree of treatment, is therefore limited to 
insensitive crops. In addition, irrigation above aquifers may pollute the underlying 
reservoirs rendering their water unsuitable for home use and, in the long run, also for 
agriculture. The Water Law empowers the Commissioner to act in preventing 
pollution, but strict regulations have not been enacted as yet. It seems that the 
regulator and his advisers are seeking compromises between the needs of sustainable 
aquifers and policies the farmers can live with.  
                                                            
6 Israel promised to desalinate the water in the carrier, but this has not been done yet.   20
Municipal Water Services 
Municipalities produce their own water or they purchase it from Mekorot. They are 
responsible for delivery to households and businesses and for the collection of sewage 
and its treatment. Prices paid by consumers, including a sewage charge, are set by the 
government to cover municipal costs. The cost includes depreciation and maintenance 
components but local politicians￿not unlike their colleagues at higher levels of 
government￿are short run maximizers; the municipalities neglect maintenance and 
use the funds saved to finance visible, aboveground projects. The outcome is obsolete 
networks, water losses, and local authorities whose interest lies, not in saving, but in 
increasing water use. The government is attempting to privatize municipal water 
supply; the model often referred to is Buenos Aires, where a French company took 
over the city￿s water services. The change is slow; municipalities are reluctant to lose 
the goose that lays the golden eggs.  
 
Water Markets 
By the wording and the spirit of the law users cannot sell their water rights. In reality 
there has always been substantial trade in water, some of it officially sanctioned and 
some without the knowledge of the Commissioner. Moreover, in moshavim 
(cooperative villages) the quota is allotted to the villages and farmers may buy from 
the village pool or sometimes sell to it. Consequently, at present, some farmers have 
access to traded water while others are barred from it.  
The justification of the official antitrade attitude was the need to maintain 
flexible policies that can be modified when circumstance change. It was thought that 
markets will strengthen the hold of private parties on their water and the property 
rights so developed will stand in the way of proper management. This consideration 
was somewhat theoretic; in practice, even now, when trade is officially forbidden, 
stable quotas are taken as belonging to the farmers and cannot be modified arbitrarily 
(￿possession is nine points of the law￿). Across the board cuts are acceptable in 
emergencies, in time of drought. And justly so, prices are the most efficient 
instrument of allocation in regular years but they are not the right means in 
emergency. We do not know what price will cut water use by the needed amount for 
one or two years and increasing the price in time of shortage will ignite strong 
political opposition: not only do we have less water but the price also rises!   21
Emergency situations are however the most appropriate time for trade in 
water. Indeed, water markets in California were most active in dry years. When 
quotas are cut administratively, some farmers are left with allocations they do not 
need and others are punished severely if they do not get more of the resource. Trade 
may amend this deficiency. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Water 
Commissioner joined forces and announced recently that in time of crisis water 
transfers were strictly forbidden. The inability to enforce the restrictive policy can be 
expected to change the underlying philosophy. 
 
Rules vs. Discretion 
The law gives the Commissioner (and the minister above him) a set of powerful 
instruments to enforce the chosen policy. The law does not however specify the policy 
or the duties of the Commissioner. The implication of the omission is that the 
lawmakers trusted the Commissioner to manage by discretion, to use professional 
judgment in formulating policies and directing the sector. Experience taught, 
however, that management by discretion failed. Throughout the years, the 
Commissioner allowed overdrafting, the sector was brought at least twice to a severe 
crisis, and aquifers have been depleted and polluted. This may be changed, 
management may be by rule: mathematical and economic models
7 can be formulated 
to calculate alternative rules and to assess their effects; for example, whether and by 
how much to curtail supply to agriculture in a dry year, or how much water to allocate 
in a rainy year. Once the principle of management by rules is accepted, the 
government will be presented with the set of alternative rules and their implications 
and it will adopt a policy of choice. The performance of the Commissioner will be 
judged by his adherence to the rules and by the pre-specified goals achieved.  
It may seem that the objective of the shift to management by rule is to clip the 
wings of the Commissioner. In some degree it is￿in light of past experience. But this 
effect should not be exaggerated, a Commissioner under strong political pressure is 
not that independent, his wings are not stretched very wide. Moreover, water 
management will always be management under uncertainty, facing risks. With 
management by rule the Commissioner is relieved of part of the responsibility for 
risky policies.  
                                                            
7 For instance: dynamic programming in Markov chains (Goldfarb and Kislev, 2001).   22
Concluding Remarks 
In the opening of the survey I expressed my opinion that the basic structure of the 
water economy of Israel was sound. The question is, what changes and reforms are 
now needed, particularly in view of the current crisis and the policies that led to it? 
The crucial action to take immediately is to reduce sharply water supply to agriculture 
(this will naturally entail heavy compensation of affected farmers). There is no other 
way, the first desalination plant on the Mediterranean will not be ready before 2003 or 
2004 and it will add only 50 MCM yearly￿less than 3% to the country￿s water 
supply. Other plants will be even slower to come. Unless there is an exceptionally 
rainy year, following the policy of mild reductions in water allocation to agriculture 
will cause severe and irreparable damage. All experts agree on the damage, some 
assert however that the Coastal Aquifer is already lost as a high quality reservoir and 
in the future its water will anyhow be purified and desalinated. The aquifer, they 
conclude, can now be mined to keep agricultural water use at the current level until 
the desalination in large quantities replaces it. 
The mining possibility illustrates sharply the necessity that the government (I 
mean the cabinet, the highest level) becomes more involved in the water economy 
than it has been in the recent past (the governments of the 1950s were very much 
involved). The mining of the Costal Aquifer will have large financial and political 
implications and the decision cannot be left to the administrative level. And this is not 
the only question of major importance that the water sector is now facing. Several 
other issues are waiting to be resolved with a long run perspective in mind. This is the 
motivation for my suggestion of management by rule in the last section of the paper.  
Israel has the expertise and the legal and administrative basis to execute the 
needed reforms. But the reforms cannot be taken for granted, governments have short 
attention spans, they have to be pushed. The public and the media will push if they 
have the information. A great deal of information accumulates on the water economy, 
most of it of technical nature, not accessible to the public at large. The policy and its 
underlying considerations must be made open and explained to the public. 
   Reforms hurt vested interests; politically they are accepted only in severe and 
painful crises. One hopes that the current crisis is painful enough. Once the sector is 
reformed, the public discussion of water will be more rational than it has been to date.   23
This will also open the way for a rational discussion of regional water issues, the 
subject of our gathering. 
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